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Abstract
What Niels Bohr called the ‘epistemological lesson’ of ‘complementarity’ was the
result of reasoning analogically from the classical conception of a mechanical state
to a new quantum mechanical conception of an ‘object’ in a mechanical state. Bohr
proposed to redefine the ‘objectivity’ essential for scientific description in terms of the
epistemological demand for unambiguously communicable descriptions of observational
results, a move which has profound consequences for how we can understand the con-
cept of the quantum mechanical state and the nature of the ‘system’ which is ‘in’ this
state. Here it is argued that the old notion of the ‘object’ which is in a classical me-
chanical state is drawn from a substance/property ontology derived from Aristotle’s
analysis of categorical propositions. In moving to describing a system in a quantum
mechanical state, the system that is ‘in’ such a state can no longer be so regarded as
a substance possessing properties. Bohr argues that the concept refers to an interac-
tion which has a feature of wholeness or ‘individuality’ that implies that the distinction
between ‘object system’ and ‘observing system’ is relative to the context of the descrip-
tion. This conclusion, in turn, implies the need for a combination of complementary
modes of description; however, because of his reticence in making ontological claims,
he failed to develop this dimension of his new framework of complementarity.
1 The Conceptual Framework for the Descrip-
tion of Nature
The concept of the quantum mechanical state of a physical system around which so
much controversy swirls was formulated by reasoning from an analogy to the classical
mechanical state. Niels Bohr repeatedly appealed to this kind of reasoning in feeling his
way from the ‘stationary states’ of his original quantized model of the atomic system
of 1913 to his mature understanding of the quantum formalisms of Heisenberg and
Schro¨dinger. As a contribution to clarifying basic concepts, here I propose to offer an
analysis of how this crucial concept of the ‘state’ of a ‘physical system’ was transformed
from the ‘intuitive’ classical concept formulated in terms derived from ordinary human
experience into the context of the ‘mysterious’ quantum theoretical representation of
the atomic domain. This transformation, and the general epistemological lesson it
teaches, is at the heart of Niels Bohr’s thinking in formulating his new framework of
complementarity.
In reconstructing the thought of an influential scientist one must be careful not to
impute to the historical actors a consciousness which itself is the product of their very
own contribution to the scientific outlook, and hence how history often has come to
perceive them. Thus Newton was no Newtonian—certainly not what that name would
have meant even by the mid-eighteenth century. And Einstein had no conception of
the Big Bang cosmology which is the boldest fruit of his contribution to the scientific
conception of the universe. In Bohr’s case there are at least two ways which we can
say the product of his labors has disoriented the philosopher’s attempt to reconstruct
how he saw the scientists’ description of nature.
The first is the historical fact that Bohr came to play the role of captain of the
philosophically quite diverse crew of Copenhagen. Whatever it was that this assortment
of geniuses who professed loyalty to Bohr held in common was erected into something
like a creed under the banner of ‘The Copenhagen Interpretation,’ the confession of
which—in the opening paragraphs of a textbook—was held to expiate the author from
demand for any further philosophical explication. ‘The Copenhagen Interpretation’ was
a term Bohr never used and surely regretted. Given its essentially strategic function
in the history of atomic physics, a sociological analysis of the party in the grip of the
Copehagenergeist, such as that offered recently by Beller,[1] can provide an illuminating
example of the dynamics of scientific belief formation, but inevitably only from the
point of view of one who already knows where the story is going. Thus this cannot
establish how the actors in these events saw what it was they were doing from their
side of the revolutionary divide. Moreover even if we grant there is no single coherent
account of nature in the so-called ‘orthodox view’—regarded as a strategic alliance
among distinct thinkers—that does not establish that the individuals associated with
it do not have a coherent view to call their own. But this does require that to make
out some coherent reconstruction of Bohr’s thinking, we need to penetrate through the
Copenhagener’s front lines, and look just at this individual physicist as he approached
these issues.
A second way in which we lose the historical scent is that we ask questions that
arise from how we currently understand the quantum formalism, which of course was
not an available option in the midst of the quantum revolution. Clearly Bohr could
not have thought in terms of mathematical representations such as the collapse of the
wave packet or operations on vectors in Hilbert space—as we are wont to do today—for
these came only later after his creative work was done. But even if we disregard its
ahistoricity, such an approach which moves from the mathematical formalism to an
account of nature, was the very opposite of Bohr’s philosophical modus operandi. His
whole career was staked on the building of atomic models and a concern with what the
physicist must do in order to make such models harmonize with the empirical evidence.
The same approach has been proposed by Fuchs in a letter to David Mermin, where
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he makes the following observation:
The issue in my mind is not to start with complex Hilbert space, unitary
evolution, the tensor product rule for combining systems, the identification
of measurements with Hermitian operators, etc., etc., and showing that
Bohr’s point of view is consistent with that. Instead it is to start with Bohr’s
point of view (or some variant thereof) and see that the precise mathematical
structure of quantum theory must follow from it. Why complex instead of
real? Why unitary, rather than simply linear? Indeed, why linear? Why
tensor product instead of tensor sum? And, so on. When we can answer
these questions, then we will really understand complementarity.[2]
Although talk about the ‘quantum mechanical state’ is central to discussions which
proceed from the current formalism, in fact that phrase was never used by Bohr. If we
want to recapture how Bohr would have regarded this concept of a quantum mechanical
state, we must approach it from his side of the revolutionary divide, not from that of
the subsequent formalism.
By avoiding these disorienting ways of asking questions, we can reconstruct a plau-
sible account of Bohr’s philosophy which is at least coherent, but frustratingly incom-
plete. To put things in philosophical jargon, I would maintain that many have misread
Bohr as advocating an anti-realist interpretation of physics, whereas I maintain that
if we look at him in the midst of the quantum revolution, we see a realist trying to
reconstruct the classical conceptual scheme for the description of nature in order to
deal with a brute shock to the physicists’ preconceptions about nature. The result was
what he called ‘complementarity’ and what it purported to be was a ‘new framework
for the description of nature.’ No matter what triumphs the Copenhagen Interpreta-
tion may have had, Bohr’s lifelong campaign to promote this new framework, which he
often called the ‘epistemological lesson’ taught to us by atomic physics, was a failure.
Perhaps one reason is that his ‘epistemological lesson’ needed an ontological lesson to
go with it, yet Bohr failed to provide any clear indication of what such a revision would
entail. Here I would like to pick up the trail and try to sketch out what I take to be
the ontological revisions suggested by the framework of complementarity.
Bohr’s formation of his philosophy of science was more or less contemporary with the
positivism of the Vienna Circle, and he does share much with the positivists, but his ‘big
picture’ in building his philosophy of science really points at least as much towards later
post-positivist images of science associated with so-called Weltanschauungen analyses.
‘Natural science’ for Bohr is that part of ‘human knowledge’ which is concerned with
the ‘description of nature.’ A ‘conceptual framework’ is necessary for expressing the
knowledge gained in this scientific description of nature in an ‘objective’ manner. The
scientist attempts to fit the framework to agree with empirical evidence generated by
the extension of the empirical basis into new domains, such as the interior of the atom.
This requires revision of the framework which is constrained both by the demand for
logical consistency and the need to accommodate the recalcitrant experience. Although
contemporary philosophers have been made very much aware of these points by the
works of Quine and Kuhn, it is worth pointing out that Bohr was writing well before
these thinkers had made such themes familiar.1
1I suspect that this may be because all these thinkers shared a common debt to pragmatism generally,
and William James in particular, but the evidence for the connection between James and Bohr, I have to
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For Bohr the crux of the revision in our understanding of how this conceptual frame-
work attaches to nature lies in the need to redefine the ‘objectivity’ of the description
of nature. In particular, the epistemological lesson Bohr drew from this revolutionary
transition taught that the ‘objectivity’ of a description cannot be based on the ontolog-
ical claim that the description refers to the properties which define the mechanical state
of a system isolated from interaction with observers. Hence he proposed to redefine
the ‘objectivity’ necessary for scientific description in the epistemic demand for unam-
biguously communicable descriptions of observational results. This move has profound
consequences for how we can understand the concept of the quantum mechanical state
and the nature of the ‘system’ which is ‘in’ this state.
2 The Classical Mechanical State of the System
The thesis I want to explore is that the old notion of the ‘entity’ or the ‘object’ which
is in a classical mechanical state is derived ultimately from a concept of ‘information’
based on the Aristotelian analysis of propositions and the substance/property ontology
associated with it. Aristotle defined ‘primary substances,’ i.e., the ‘entities’ or ‘beings’
of which the physical world is composed, as that which is the ultimate subject of all
predicative assertions but which themselves can never be predicated of anything else.
While such primary substances are the ultimate individuals of the Aristotelian descrip-
tion of the physical universe, all such assertions, i.e. all statements of ‘information,’
predicate universals of the particular substance which is its subject. These are the
substance’s ‘accidents’ or ‘properties.’
For Aristotle ‘scientific knowledge’ arises only when the active mind, nous, grasps
the set of universals which are essential to that substance’s being what it is; but in
doing so, knowledge can have as its object only the ‘whatness’ of that substance, never
its individual ‘thisness,’ its particularity. The Aristotelian solution was to make the
substance into a hylomorphic synthesis of form and matter with the universal form, the
object of scientific knowledge, incorporated into the ‘matter’ which made a substance
into an individual particular being. But while one can speak intelligibly of formed
matter, the concept of pure ‘prime matter’ stripped of all form, becomes—on this
analysis—ultimately unknowable, that of which no universal predicate can be affirmed.
For this reason ultimately, in the Aristotelian system, knowledge of the individual of
this particular, contingent world recedes from our grasp.
Ancient epistemology was not concerned with the distinction between the subject’s
perception—of which we are immediately aware in consciousness—versus an ‘objective
reality’ which in some way is imagined to lie ‘behind’ that conscious experience. For
Aristotle we experience the world objectively as it is, and the world is as we objectively
experience it. But in the modern philosophy of the Enlightenment, the mechanization
of nature accompanying the Cartesian turn toward the certainty of what is present in
subjective consciousness led to a conception of nature wholly unlike the world revealed
in human experience. While the problem of accounting for knowledge of the particu-
lar individual ‘thisness’ of concrete beings confounded Aristotelian ontology, the new
mechanistic world-view could easily deal with that problem by identifying the indi-
vidual by its unique spatio-temporal locus. Thus the ‘objects’ of which the physical
admit, is equivocal and it is not likely it will ever be established to everyone’s satisfaction.
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universe is composed had to be things of which spatio-temporal locus, the property
which makes a kinematic description possible, could be necessarily and universally
predicated. Extension became the ‘essence’ of physical substance. This was significant
for it meant that physical beings, the things that were ‘in’ classical mechanical states,
must be the sorts of things that can be pictured ; they are essentially, we might say,
‘visualizable in space and time’ even though (as Berkeley pointed out) no one has ever
seen extended substance simpliciter.
With Newton’s achievement the mechanization of nature added to extended sub-
stances the dynamical properties necessary to account for the causes of change in
kinematic properties over time. This then completed the list of properties objectively
possessed by ‘mechanical systems,’ because together the kinematic and dynamic prop-
erties were all the predicates needed for a complete mechanical description of physical
systems and their interactions. Therefore to construct a mechanistic ontology one
needed only this small handful of properties which were solely those essential for a
mechanical description of extended substances. Thus they came to replace the boun-
teous supply of Aristotelian natural essences, as the only universals which could be
truly predicated of individual beings as they objectively exist in Nature. Aside from
these true cases of objective predication, the rest of those universals we affirm of the
objects of sensory experience have only subjective validity; these properties exist only
in human sense perception of the world.
From the time of the scientific revolution initiating this classical mechanical world-
view, the concept of an ‘objective’ description was understood in this ontological sense,
as referring to a description which was limited to predicating only those properties
actually possessed by the ‘object’ being described. These so-called ‘primary qualities’
of bodies are ‘real’ in the sense of existing apart from any observation of them; they
are ‘out there’ in the ‘world.’ In contrast the far larger host of ‘secondary qualities’
which objects are perceived as having merely exist as the causal effects in a subject’s
consciousness of the mechanical interaction between bodily sense organs and ‘external’
bodies which really possess only the primary qualities. The mechanician’s conception
of the physical universe may seem an austere shadow of the luxuriant world of sensory
experience, but it’s the real thing. It is what is required by an ‘objective’ description.
Of course this distinction between primary and secondary qualities arose in a Carte-
sian rationalist conception of the mechanical world view, and once imported into em-
piricism by Locke, it was exposed as an unfounded ‘philosophers’ distinction by Berke-
ley. No empiricist since Hume would countenance this rationalist hang up. In spite of
that fact, up to the quantum revolution this seventeenth century understanding of the
definition of the mechanical state of a physical system as essentially the representation
of the primary qualities of a substance remained a standing rationalist bastion in a
field otherwise conquered by empiricism. Yet in creating its concept of the ‘mechanical
state’ of the ‘system’ from the older ontology of ‘substance’ and ‘accident,’ and making
this the basis of ‘objectivity,’ classical mechanism naively moved from a concept of how
we know the world to how the world must be with a distinctly pre-modern ease. Kant’s
revolution was ‘Copernican’ in that it showed you cannot simply ‘read off’ the structure
of Being from the structure of Knowing, as the older Enlightenment philosophers had
naively presumed you could. But Kant’s revolution notwithstanding, the continued
triumph of mechanism throughout the 18th and 19th centuries could easily be used
to support the most materialistic of ontologies based on a univocal correlation of the
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‘primary qualities’ of the mechanical description with the properties of an objective
‘Reality.’
3 Bohr’s Rational Generalization of the Con-
cept of the ‘Mechanical State of the System’
The central theme of Bohr’s career was the effort to fashion a successful theoretical
model of the atomic system. From his experience with Rutherford at Manchester he
entered the world of physics with the conviction that classical mechanics could not be
successful at accounting for the stability of atoms by representing them as classical
mechanical systems of charged particles. Although the notion of electron orbits often
assumes center stage in presentations of Bohr’s model, in fact Bohr saw the heart of
his ‘revolution’ to be the postulate that atomic systems exist in a quantized series of
‘stationary states’ which defy the laws of classical mechanics. Interactions between
atomic systems and the electromagnetic field or other particles therefore imply dis-
continuous changes of state. “Taking the indivisibility of the quantum of action as a
starting-point,” Bohr tells us, he was led to suggest “that every change in the state
of an atom should be regarded as an individual process, incapable of more detailed
description, by which the atom goes over from one so-called stationary state into an-
other. According to this view, the spectra of the elements do not give us immediate
information about the motions of the atomic parts, but each spectral line is associated
with a transition process between two stationary states....the necessity of making an
extensive use, nevertheless, of the classical concepts, upon which depends ultimately
the interpretation of all experience, gave rise to the formulation of the so-called corre-
spondence principle which expresses our endeavors to utilize all the classical concepts
by giving them a suitable quantum-theoretical re-interpretation.” [3] Thus ab initio
Bohr’s work was predicated on an outlook which demanded in the atomic domain a
new ‘quantum theoretical re-interpretation’ of a physical system being in a ‘mechanical
state’ to replace the classical mechanical conception.
Bohr’s ground level argument appears in variations in many of his essays. He starts
with the observation that widening experience often forces revisions of the conceptual
scheme employed for the description of nature. He then turns to Planck’s ‘discovery’
(not ‘invention’) of the quantum of action as forcing such a revision. Bohr calls this
surprising discovery the ‘quantum postulate’ and maintains that it has been forced
upon us by the need to account for the known relations between matter and radiation.
Thus the quantum revolution demands a revision of the conceptual framework for the
description of nature because at the atomic level we must describe physical systems
as changing their states discontinuously. Bohr expresses this point by saying that the
quantum postulate requires that ‘interactions’ between ‘systems’ be accorded a feature
of ‘wholeness’ or ‘individuality.’
Right from his 1913 model of the atom—long before the development of what we
know as ‘quantum theory’—Bohr always emphasized two aspects of his atomic model:
First, all information about the properties of atomic systems comes through interac-
tions between atomic systems and the field or other material systems in which the
atomic system changes from one ‘stationary state’ to another ‘stationary state’ discon-
tinuously. Second, when no dynamical exchange is taking place between the atomic
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system and electromagnetic radiation or other material particles, the atomic system
exists in a ‘stationary state’ isolated from interaction. While one may construct famil-
iar visualizable spatio-temporal models of this atomic system in its ‘stationary states’
isolated from any interaction, such constructions are purely theoretical abstractions be-
cause by definition of the ‘stationary state,’ the properties of the ‘orbits’ or otherwise
visualizable trajectories used in these kinematic ‘pictures’ cannot be observed, because
observation is interaction:
...any attempt to fix the space-time co-ordinates of the constituent particles
of an atom would ultimately involve an essentially uncontrollable exchange
of energy and momentum with the measuring rods and clocks which pre-
vents an unambiguous correlation of the dynamical behaviour of the atomic
particles before the observation with their later behaviour. Inversely, every
application of conservation theorems, for instance to the energy balance in
atomic reactions, involves an essential renunciation as regards the pursuance
in space and time of the individual atomic particles. In other words, the use
of the idea of stationary states stands in a mutually exclusive relationship
to the applicability of space-time pictures.[4]
The visualizable ‘space-time pictures’ of the stationary states by means of orbits in
space and time cannot be understood realistically because the energy exchanged be-
tween the atom and the field is a function not of the orbital characteristics but of
the differences between the stationary states. Because they involve such discontinuous
changes in state, interactions at the atomic level cannot be described as mechanical
processes taking place in space and time.
Classical mechanics was able to get away with its conception of defining the state
of an isolated system by observation only because the presumption of the continuity
of interaction allowed one to make the dynamical effect of the interaction involved in
the observation infinitesimally small. In much the same way that it was commonly
held that relativistic mechanics is a ‘generalization’ of the ‘special case’ of classical
mechanics in which the speed of light is imagined to be infinite, Bohr held that the
quantum mechanical description is a rational generalization of the special case of the
classical description, where it is imagined the parameter of action is defined for a
continuous range of values.
Of course this view of progress which represents earlier theories as ‘special cases’
of later more general theories was common coin during the heyday of positivism when
Bohr wrote, but today’s philosophers are keenly aware of a well known argument against
it by Thomas Kuhn.[5] He argued that this alleged reduction of earlier theories to
special cases of later theories is misleading to the extent that although the analogous
theories are expressed in parallel vocabularies, in the transition from one framework
to the next, crucial terms change meanings. Although Bohr no where advocates the
radical semantic incommensurability which so preoccupied philosophers in the decades
following Kuhn’s provocative work, far from taking the standard positivist line, Bohr
actually anticipated Kuhn in cautioning that in this new quantum description of atomic
systems one must recognize that the classical descriptive concepts employed attach to
nature in a manner different from that of their use in the classical context. In particular,
to pass the criterion of ‘science’ the revision of the ‘classical’ framework necessary to
accommodate the quantum postulate must result in a description of nature which is
‘objective,’ but the ‘objectivity’ demanded of a description of the quantum state of a
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system now has to be given a new meaning because of the semantic shift to the new
framework.
Let us see how Bohr reached this conclusion: What we would like to determine by
observation—based on our classically trained expectations—is a space-time ‘picture’
in which we ‘visualize’ the state of the system ‘objectively,’ i.e. how it is isolated from
any perturbation in its state resulting from the observation. The system is imagined,
along classical lines, as an entity which possesses essentially those properties which
define its classical mechanical state. But observations require an interaction with the
object system, which, because of the ‘indivisibility’ of interaction at the atomic level,
alters its state in a non-determined way. For determining what state a system is in by
means of observation, the dynamical conservation principles must be employed to trace
the causal interaction between observed system and measuring instruments. Thus the
classical description employed a conjunction of dynamical conservation principles for
a causal analysis of the observational interaction with a spatio-temporal visualizable
representation of the mechanical state of the system. But the indivisibility of interac-
tion expressed by the quantum postulate now requires that this conjunction becomes
transformed into a ‘complementary ’ or ‘reciprocal ’ relationship, as expressed in Heisen-
berg’s infamous relations. Complementarity is thus first proposed as a point of view
to replace what Bohr called the ‘the frame of the ordinary causal description’ of the
‘ideal of causality’ employed by the classical framework. In a nice summary from 1937
he writes:
However, a still further revision of the problem of observation has since been
made necessary by the discovery of the universal quantum of action, which
has taught us that the whole mode of description of classical physics, includ-
ing the theory of relativity, retains its adequacy only as long as all quantities
of action entering into the description are large compared to Planck’s quan-
tum. When this is not the case, as in the region of atomic physics, there
appear new uniformities which cannot be fitted into the frame of the or-
dinary causal description ....Indeed this circumstance presents us with a
situation concerning the analysis and synthesis of experience which is en-
tirely new in physics and forces us to replace the ideal of causality by a
more general viewpoint usually termed ‘complementarity.’ The apparently
incompatible sorts of information about the behavior of the object under ex-
amination which we get by different experimental arrangements can clearly
not be brought into connection with each other in the usual way, but may,
as equally essential for an exhaustive account of all experience, be regarded
as ‘complementary’ to each other.[6]
Note that Bohr presents this line of reasoning entirely from the quantum postulate and
his general philosophical position regarding the need to revise conceptual frameworks
with the expansion of experience into new domains. Nowhere does he appeal to the
specific formalism of Heisenberg or Schro¨dinger or the properties of a mathematical
representation or model. While Bohr’s formulation of this argument was coeval with
Heisenberg’s derivation of the indeterminacy relations, it was the outcome of a path
on which Bohr had been set long before 1927, rather than a move to explain or jus-
tify Heisenberg’s surprising mathematical derivation after the fact. Bohr saw in the
indeterminacy relations confirmation of a point of view he had reached primarily from
conceptual analysis.
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Having established the need to revise the classical conceptual framework, Bohr
then calls attention to the fact that an objective description of an observation requires
an ‘object’ to be unambiguously distinguished from the physical systems employed as
‘measuring instruments’ in the observation.
This circumstance, at first sight paradoxical, finds its elucidation in the
recognition that in this region it is no longer possible sharply to distinguish
between the autonomous behavior of a physical object and its inevitable
interaction with other bodies serving as measuring instruments, the direct
consideration of which is excluded by the very nature of the concept of obser-
vation in itself....In particular, the frustration of every attempt to analyse
more closely the ‘individuality’ of single atomic processes, symbolized by
the quantum of action, by a subdivision of their course, is explained by the
fact that each section in this course definable by a direct observation would
demand a measuring arrangement which would be incompatible with the
appearance of the uniformities considered.[6]
By our free choice in designing a particular experiment we bring about the occurrence
of a particular ‘phenomenon,’ as Bohr used that word after EPR in 1935. What Bohr
calls the ‘interpretation’ of the phenomenon as an ‘observation’ or ‘measurement’ which
yields a certain outcome requires describing the phenomenon as a dynamical interaction
between the ‘object’ and the ‘measuring instruments.’ To make the distinction between
object and observing instruments unambiguous in our description of the phenomenon,
we must employ theoretical notions taken from classical physics, but the wholeness
or ‘individuality’ of that interaction required by the quantum postulate implies that
exactly where that distinction is drawn is a function of the particular description and
whatever it is described as a measurement of. “Ultimately, every observation can, of
course, be reduced to our sense perceptions,” he tells us, but the “circumstance... that
in interpreting observations use has always to be made of theoretical notions entails that
for every particular case it is a question of convenience at which point the concept of
observation involving the quantum postulate with its inherent ‘irrationality’ is brought
in....After all, the concept of observation is in so far arbitrary as it depends upon which
objects are included in the system to be observed.”[7] It is this arbitrariness inherent
in the description of a indivisible interaction as a measurement which later in response
to EPR led Bohr to contend that in describing the interaction as an observation which
determines the observed property of the object, our description will be ‘ambiguous’
unless the entire interaction—the whole ‘phenomenon’—is described. It is worth noting
that the ‘ambiguity’ of which he speaks is not that it is ‘ambiguous’ whether the system
is to be considered a ‘wave’ or a ‘particle,’ but rather that it is the ‘description’ of
the state of the system which is ‘ambiguous’ because the experimental arrangements
necessary to determine both canonical state parameters are mutually exclusive. He
first introduces ‘complementarity’ in his ‘Como paper’ of 1927 with this remark:
This situation has far-reaching consequences. On one hand, the definition
of the state of a physical system, as ordinarily understood, claims the elim-
ination of all external disturbances. But in that case, according to the
quantum postulate, any observation will be impossible, and, above all, the
concepts of space and time lose their immediate sense. On the other hand,
if in order to make observation possible we permit certain interactions with
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suitable agencies of measurement, not belonging to the system, an unam-
biguous definition of the state of the system is naturally no longer possi-
ble, and there can be no question of causality in the ordinary sense of the
word. The very nature of the quantum theory thus forces us to regard the
space-time co-ordination and the claim of causality, the union of which char-
acterizes the classical theories, as complementary but exclusive features of
the description, symbolizing the idealization of observation and definition
respectively.[7]
He observes, “This situation has far-reaching consequences” but aside from telling
us that “space-time co-ordination and the claim of causality” are“complementary but
exclusive features of the description” it is far from clear what these consequences are.
Here I want to suggest that these consequences are ‘far-reaching’ because they im-
ply that the ‘objectivity’ of the resulting description can no longer be grounded in the
ontological supposition that the description of nature predicates properties of its ‘ob-
ject’ which refer to properties actually possessed by the object system apart from any
observational interaction with it. Thus to save the objectivity of the description, the
‘quantum mechanical state’ of a physical system must be understood in a different
sense from the way the classical mechanical state description was understood.
In his new framework, Bohr moves ‘objectivity’ from the ontological context given
to it by classical mechanism and reconstructs it on an epistemological basis. ‘Objective’
description now means description which is unambiguously expressed in terms of ev-
eryday human experience, of the ‘common framework adapted to human use and daily
life’ such that everyone could agree on it. Again Bohr’s reasoning precapitulates the
subsequent development of positivism. In the 1920’s and 30’s when Bohr was writing,
positivists hoped to reduce the superstructure of theoretical statements to foundational
‘incorrigible’ observation reports expressed in a purely observational vocabulary. This
would have been the empiricists’ surrogate for the rationalist doctrine of primary prop-
erties. They would refer directly to properties of elements of pure experience, or sense
data or whatever, unsullied by any subjective ‘interpretation’ put upon what is alleged
to be ‘directly given.’ But the quest for such a foundational vocabulary was doomed.
Eventually positivists—as well as the pragmatists and Popperian realists—had to re-
treat back to the conventionalist position that there is no one privileged language or
conceptual scheme which attaches directly to empirical reality. Alternative possibil-
ities exist, and the choice of the language that actually does get chosen is made for
pragmatic, rather than foundational, reasons. This was Carnap’s move to ‘physical-
ism’: observation sentences are simply those on which all rational persons with normal
sense organs will agree. In this sense Bohr’s new conception of ‘objectivity’—like the
positivist recourse to physicalism— provides an empiricist foundational ‘observation’
statement, but it is only a relative foundation, relative to the particular framework
used to express this particular description of nature. It is, I think, fair to say that
Bohr’s proposed revision of the conception of objective knowledge is at least as much
‘pragmatic’ as ‘positivistic,’ but the point I want to make here is not its philosophical
pedigree, but that once ‘objectivity’ is defined in this manner, its basis is epistemic,
resting on what we are justified in accepting or believing, rather than ontological, seated
in the properties independently possessed by an individual object, a body as described
by classical mechanism.
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4 The Ontological Lesson of Complementarity
Because Bohr redefines ‘objectivity’ in the manner he proposes, in moving from describ-
ing systems in classical mechanical states to describing them in quantum mechanical
states the system which is in such a state can no longer be regarded as a ‘substance
possessing properties’ precisely because what we predicate of the system in such a state
is not, in general, regarded as the ‘properties’ possessed by a substance. Now in the
quantum description, the ‘system’ which is in a quantum mechanical state must be
reconceived as an interaction which has a feature of ‘wholeness’ or ‘individuality’ that
implies that the distinction between ‘object system’ and ‘observing system’ necessary
for making a description of that interaction ‘unambiguous’ is relative to the context
of the description. He certainly recognized that this move would have ontological
consequences, for in the passage immediately preceding his inaugural introduction of
‘complementary’ he tells us that “...the quantum postulate implies that any observation
of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the agency of observation not to
be neglected. Accordingly, an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can
neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation.”[7] But aside
from this merely negative declaration that they do not have “an independent reality in
the ordinary physical sense,” Bohr leaves us in the dark ontologically, when it comes
to the sort of non-ordinary ‘reality’ we are to ascribe to the objects of atomic physics.
This reticence in making ontological claims left this dimension of complementarity un-
developed. So from here on we must extrapolate from—or perhaps reconstruct—what
Bohr has told us about his ‘new viewpoint.’ Bohr developed an epistemological lesson
because his argument terminated in a conclusion about how we gain scientific knowl-
edge about physical systems at the atomic level. But epistemological claims about
what kind of knowledge we can or cannot have about such systems have ontological
implications about what such systems which are in quantum mechanical states must be.
Until such implications are understood, the ‘foundations’ of the quantum theoretical
description of matter will remain mysterious.
Traditional realists have aspired to construct ontological models on the basis of a
pattern of reasoning long enshrined in the classical conception of an ‘objective’ de-
scription within a substance/property ontology. Following such reasoning, a ‘realist’
reading of complementarity seems to produce paradoxes such as a particle which traces
a trajectory through the left slit, but ‘knows’ whether the right slit is opened or closed;
or a cat in a superposition of alive and dead states. Such paradoxes do not arise be-
cause of any application of the formalism, which in each case is self consistent and in
accord with the empirical data. However, the paradoxical character of the description
lies in the disconnect between the concept of being the sort of ‘system’ which could be
in a quantum mechanical state, and our ontological preconceptions about substances
and their properties conditioned by classical mechanical expectations.
If we say that the ‘system’ which is described as ‘in a quantum mechanical state’
is not understood via the traditional Aristotelian conception of subject as substance,
that of which our description truly predicates properties, but rather is an indivisible
phenomenon described as an interaction of which we predicate possible outcomes, the
paradoxical quality of the concept of the quantum mechanical state disappears. This is
what Bohr called the unexpected feature of ‘atomicity’ in the quantum world. What are
indivisible are not tiny ‘bodies,’ Cartesian rei extensae, but processes or events in which
the prior state of one system has a causal effect on the subsequent state of another
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system. Thus the ontological lesson which the need for recourse to complementary
descriptions teaches us is that the physical properties to which the classical concepts
refer now belong to the termini of an indivisible phenomenon; they define at one end
its preparation state and at the other its outcome state. The quantum-mechanical
‘systems’ of which we predicate ‘quantum mechanical states’ are interactions with a
‘superposition’ of probabilistically weighted possible outcomes.
Much of our confusion, it would seem, arises from what amounts to an equivocation
on what is an ‘object’ in the description of nature. Classically the ‘object of our
description,’ a body possessing primary kinematic and dynamic properties, was the
same object which is the ‘system’ that is ‘in a classical mechanical state.’ Whether
that system was described as ‘interacting’ with another system or as ‘isolated’ from
interaction classically was irrelevant. In the quantum theoretical description of nature
at the microlevel we can no longer move directly from observed system to isolated
system, but the tendency to do so is deeply entrenched because the objects in the
world of our ordinary perceptual experience, which are the ultimate referents of any
description of an empirical outcome, are objects which can be treated as ‘isolated’
from any dynamical effects of our perception of them. Consequently the predicative
assertions we make about them can be treated as attributing properties to substances in
the manner long ago analyzed by Aristotle. When we treat statements about the things
described by quantum mechanics in the same way, because of the quantum postulate,
we are led to paradoxical conclusions. Therefore, the object of our description, the
‘system’ which is ‘in a quantum mechanical state,’ cannot be a substance possessing
properties, but must be regarded as a whole phenomenon which theory allows us to
interpret as an interaction between measuring system and the object—the ‘atomic
system’—of which a measurement outcome is predicated. But the quantum postulate,
implying as it does the indivisibility of such interactions, forces us recognize that the
‘object’ in this sense of that of which we predicate a measurement outcome is not the
same ‘object’ which is the system ‘in a quantum mechanical state.’
While I would contend that such an ontological lesson, once fully absorbed into the
physicist’s conception of nature, would remove the paradoxical or mysterious quality of
the microdomain, there remains—of course—something ‘surprising’ about this quan-
tum description. It is that the objects of our description, these interactions, do not
have determined outcomes. If Bohr and the Copenhageners are right, indeterminacy is
a real aspect of Nature; and quantum theory is, after all, the consequence of a funda-
mental indeterminacy of nature at the microlevel. This is surprising against classical
intuitions, but not ‘paradoxical’ in the same sense as a cat in a superposition of alive
and dead states.
Of course we have had nearly a century to get used to the idea of indeterminacy at
the atomic level. We’re not so classically obsessed anymore, and that’s not so terribly
‘surprising.’ But the ontological lesson—at least to a realist—that remains also still
‘surprising’ is that if the seeds of being are not substances possessing essentially spatial
locus but are interactions which have a feature of ‘indivisibility’ or ‘atomicity,’ then
a single whole interaction may very well have nonlocal outcomes. Bohr’s response to
EPR explicitly warned that a description would be ‘ambiguous’—and so not ‘objective’
in his sense—if the entire phenomenon is not included as a single indivisible whole in
the description. ‘Quantum systems’ are ‘non-separable’ precisely because on this view
they are not spatio-temporally located substances; we must, in Bohr’s words, ‘renounce
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space-time pictures.’ Thus in Bell type phenomena spatially separated measurements
on ‘particles’ all form part of the outcome of a single interaction in a single ‘quantum
mechanical state.’ Perhaps this remains surprising to us in a way which I suspect it
didn’t seem to Bohr from his ‘new point of view of complementarity’ because we have
not followed the same journey he did. After all, these violations of determinacy and
locality had their birth in Bohr’s conception of the interaction between an atom and
the field as a ‘discontinuous’ transition between non-visualizable stationary states: in
the famous words attributed to Schro¨dinger: ‘those damned quantum jumps.’
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